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'Dominance by birthright'? Reconfiguration of firm boundaries to acquire new resources 
and capabilities
1. Introduction
Innovative 'green' technologies might remain as niches facing otherwise insurmountable socio-
technical regimes. Entrepreneurial 'green' entrants need to compete with the incumbents in 
order to survive and grow. The literature on industry lifecycles provides a good understanding 
of new entrant behaviour, survival and shakeout. Each entrant brings along and leverages a 
distinct set of pre-entry resources and capabilities (R&Cs) into its new operations in the target 
industry (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Some researchers (Klepper and Simons, 2000; Kim and 
Park, 2006) argued that the survival of the entrant is their birthright i.e. the survival of new 
entrant is determined by their pre-entry R&Cs. The persistence of early entrants, however, 
remains an understudied field (Gomez et al., 2016). Historical study of brewing industry in the 
U.S. (Walter et al., 2014) also suggested that de alio firms with stronger pre-entry R&Cs 
particularly dynamics capabilities survived the increasing competitive pressure.
The focus on pre-entry R&Cs in firm survival raises two key questions: (i) which pre-entry 
R&Cs matter most in firm survival in the new industry? and (ii) What are the possible strategies 
to stay competitive in regard to their pre-entry R&Cs? In order to answer the first question, we 
need to examine the taxonomy of R&Cs. The ownership of R&Cs determines firm 
competitiveness and thereby firm survival (Penrose, 1959). Arguably, this view of firm survival 
is equally applicable to any new entrant who is exploiting its R&Cs in the new industry 
(Klepper, 2002a). Helfat and Lieberman (2002) distinguish between two categories of entrants' 
R&Cs – 'core' and 'complementary' – which are context-free. We argue that further 
classification is required for a more useful taxonomy of entrant R&Cs. There is a potentially 
long list of core R&Cs ranging from the technology required for production to skills in 
marketing of the products. The decision to enter into a new industry obviously cannot be based 
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on complete accumulation of every one of the core R&Cs. Managers need to be able to assess 
the opportunity of entry and subsequent strategy for survival or growth based on incomplete 
information. Our study, based on the case of biofuel sector, proposes that core R&Cs need to 
the further classified based on whether the R&C are criticality and ease of acquisition, which 
are context dependent and would be more meaningful for managers making entry decisions.  
As for the second question about competitive strategies for pre-entry R&Cs, studies of firm 
evolution (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Jacobides et al., 2009; Helfat, 2015) suggest that a 
firm's prior experience could lubricate or impose constraints on the evolution of the 
configuration and governance of the value chain. The embedded historical context of a firm, 
described as fundamental forces - alongside other market and institutional forces - shapes 
industrial structure (Geels, 2010). Shifting firm boundaries and the rationale for expanding into 
other stages of the value chain, thereby changing the vertical structure, are path dependent (Kim 
and Park, 2006). In a study of the U.S. biofuel value chain, Qian et al. (2012) found that a firm 
has a higher likelihood of internalizing a stage in the value chain where it has pre-entry 
experience. This is equally applicable to de alio firms with integrative capability and de novo 
firms with related founder's experience. Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether a firm 
should extend to a stage in the value chain where it does not have any pre-entry experience. 
In weighting their chance of survival and growth in the biofuel sector, entrants actively acquire 
critical R&Cs, thereby expanding the firm's boundary along the vertical supply chain by 
internalizing other activities irrespective of their pre-entry R&Cs. We find evidence of path 
dependency, but also evidence of the possibility of breaking away from path dependency. Our 
study provides support on the changes of firm boundary particularly in seeking new R&Cs, 
which are critical for their survival and growth in this new industry. We find evidence in the 
evolution of the biofuel sector of a trend towards bi-directional vertical integration. 
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Downstream firms integrate backward and upstream firms integrate forward in order to actively 
pursue R&Cs, contradicting both the path-dependent view and the view that firms will seek to 
expand to occupy the more profitable, higher value, segment(s) of any value chain. 
In Section 2, we present a literature review on past studies of the R&Cs of new entrants. We 
then offer a brief description of the development of the biofuel sector through 2012 in Section 
3. Section 4 expands on the methodology and data used in our research. In Section 5, we analyze 
the major entrants and reclassify their pre-entry R&Cs. We then attempt to explain the 
phenomenon of bi-directional vertical integration in Section 6, where firms extend their control 
up and down along the value chain. In Section 7, we propose an extension to the R&C taxonomy 
for entrants and conclude by describing how firms, building on the advantages found in their 
pre-entry R&Cs, seek to control critical R&Cs, which they were deprived of at birth.
2. Entrants and pre-entry experience
Entrants and their pre-entry experience exert a key influence on industry evolution. A standard 
theme in the strategy literature is to compare the competitive advantage of an established firm 
with that of a young and dynamic firm entering a new industry (Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). On 
one hand, established (or de alio) firms diversifying from another industry (Carroll et al., 1996) 
will possess relevant resources and distinctive competencies gained in their previous industry, 
which can be leveraged into the new operations (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Klepper and Simons, 
2000, Uzunca, 2018), rendering de novo entrants to have few or no opportunities to survive 
(Knudsen et al., 2014). There are various theories on different types of 'everagable' R&Cs - or 
core competencies, which are defined as the 'bundle of skills and technologies' (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994: 199) that enables services to be delivered to customers. On the other hand, new 
(or de novo) start-up entrants (Carroll et al., 1996) do not carry the baggage of older firms 
(Barnett and Carroll, 1995) nor do they display the same inertia (Haveman, 1992) and are, 
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therefore, more flexible and adaptable in meeting the fresh challenges confronting a new 
industry. Debate persists over the types and characteristics of industries – e.g. the role of 
technology innovation, market size and power, or industrial policy (Mingo and Khanna, 2013) 
- that can impact on the success of either type of entrant. 
Despite the acknowledged importance of entrant background, there are surprisingly few studies 
by industrial economists and strategy scholars on 'where entrants come from and how their 
backgrounds affect their fates' (Klepper and Simons, 2000: 998). The studies that have analyzed 
the background of firms suggest that their histories do have an effect on their survival (Carroll 
et al., 1996; Klepper, 2002b; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Thompson, 2005). Klepper and 
Simons (2000) propose that de alio firms with prior experience in the value chain are more 
likely to survive. Empirical studies have been conducted with respect to manufacturing firms 
in general (Bellone et al., 2008) as well as specific industries such as automobiles (Klepper, 
2002a); television transmission (Klepper and Simons, 2000); high-technology (Klepper and 
Sleeper, 2005); shipbuilding (Thompson, 2005); lasers (Buenstorf, 2007), green industries (de 
Silva et al., 2017), and agricultural biotechnology sector (Moeen, 2017).
Moreover, the survival and competitiveness of a firm also depends on the type of R&Cs at the 
firm's disposal (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), which highlights the need for a new entrant 
to capitalize on the R&Cs it brings to the new industry. Vidal and Mitchell (2013) propose that 
entrants need to develop complementary resources, and Finney et al. (2008) point to reinventing 
the firms' resource base but provide few additional details. Moeen (2017) further demonstrates 
that a firm's integrative capability, at the stage of initial investment prior to the point of entry 
into a nascent industry, is an important factor in entry decisions, particularly for technology-
related sectors.
We adopt the definitions proposed by Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 999): 'A resource refers to an 
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asset or input to production (tangible or intangible) that an organization owns, controls, or has 
access to on a semi-permanent basis. An organizational capability refers to the ability of an 
organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational resources, for the 
purpose of achieving a particular end result.' Helfat and Lieberman (2002) provide a useful 
classification of entrants' R&Cs into 'core' and 'complementary' in making a decision on market 
entry. 'Core' R&Cs refer to knowledge required to create a product or service such as 
technological knowledge or customer needs; whereas 'Complementary' R&Cs are needed to 
support the 'Core' in order to generate profits such as through finance and customer services. 
However, these context-free classifications have their limitations, particularly in terms of 
understanding core capabilities –core R&Cs for one industry might not be 'core' for another. 
Therefore, we propose a further subdivision of core R&Cs into critical or not critical R&Cs, 
which depends on examining the specifics of different industries. Critical R&Cs might be easily 
accumulated or acquired within a reasonably short period of time, therefore, the next level of 
the taxonomy is ease of acquisition. The authors propose the following taxonomic structure of 
pre-entry R&Cs: 
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Contextual factors can play an influential role in the industry evolution of vertical firm structure 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: 82; Helfat, 2015). The evolution of vertical structure depends on 
many factors. The early understanding of this evolution adopts an efficiency perspective. Stigler 
(1951), building on Adam Smith's division of labor, suggested that new industry evolves from 
a vertically integrated firm towards vertical dis-integration to reduce production costs as the 
market size expands and technology becomes more mature in order to support economies of 
scale at different stages of production. It will then begin to re-integrate after the market size 
declines. Coase (1973) and later Williamson (1985) extended this argument to include 
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transaction costs in addition to production costs in the analysis of the structure of economic 
organizations. As transaction cost theory was becoming increasingly prominent, Eisenhardt 
(1989) argued that the principal-agent dilemma warranted taking into account internal 
managerial costs in vertical integration decisions. Specific factors related to products and 
technology are equally important, for example, the degree of product standardization and 
codifiability (Jacobides, 2005), a firm's innovative capabilities and resources (Wernerfelt, 
1984), and low cost or differentiated innovative products (Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2016). 
The other main alternative explanation of vertical structure evolution is an institutional 
perspective (Williamson, 1996), which involves market power (Stuckey, 1983), barriers to 
entry (Riordan, 2008), and relational factors (Gereffi et al., 2005)     
3. Rapid expansion of the biofuel s ctor through 2012
The global biofuel industry expanded rapidly over two decades peaking in 2010. After 2012, 
global production has roughly stabilized (RFA, 2016), as has policy innovation. We focus our 
study on the bio-ethanol segment of the industry, rather than biodiesel, since bioethanol 
production volumes have been much larger and hence the sector is more mature. The production 
of bioethanol grew from 30.7 billion liters in 2000 to an estimated 104.5 billion liters in 2012, 
equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 10.7% (F.O. Licht, 2012). The size of the biofuel 
industry (where fuel-ethanol is the major type of biofuels) in 2017 was about 3% of the global 
transport energy consumption (2.8 billion tonnes of oil equivalent) (BP, 2018), which is not 
insignificant. Since 2012, global growth has slowed to about 5% per annum (Based on F.O. 
Licht's World Ethanol and Biofuels Reports). 
Bioethanol has been produced around the globe – Brazil has historically been the largest 
producer in the world but was overtaken by the U.S. in 2006. By the end of 2012, the U.S. and 
Brazil were producing about 53 billion liters (51% of world production) and 23 billion liters 
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(22%) respectively. 
In terms of the market, roughly 80% of global bioethanol production the first decade of 21st 
century was supplied to the transportation fuel-ethanol market, as an additive/substitute for 
gasoline in the transportation fuel market. This market was the main driver of growth in 
production. The remaining 20% of production serves the rather stable industrial and beverage 
sectors (F.O. Licht, 2012). 
The development of the fuel-ethanol market is primarily driven by market forces – for instance, 
high oil prices and relatively lower ethanol prices over the period in question – and government 
policies with varying objectives such as mitigating climate change, energy security, supply 
chain management, consumer adoption, rural development, job creation and development of 
biotechnologies (Wiesenthal, et al., 2009; Chen and Wang, 2017; Ye et al., 2018). By 2010, 
more than fifty countries had adopted policies either to create domestic markets or to develop 
production capabilities for biofuels (IEA, 2011), despite the unsettled debate on the 
sustainability of biofuel industry.
Consequently, biofuels rapidly gained market share, especially in Brazil, the U.S., Europe and 
China. Fuel-ethanol, for example, accounted for about 6% of the global gasoline market in 
2010, having increased its market share four-fold over the decade from 1.4% in 2000 (EIA, 
2013). Brazil saw the deepest penetration of fuel-ethanol, rising from 22.4% in 2000 to roughly 
50% of motor vehicle fuel consumption after 2008. The growth of ethanol penetration was even 
more rapid in the U.S. – the largest gasoline-consuming country with more than 40% of the 
world consumption – rising from 1.2% in 2000 to 8.5% in 2010. 
The bioethanol value chain was formed by combining the upstream part of the agro-food chain 
with the downstream part of the transportation fuel chain. The new value chain can be divided 
into three distinct production stages - upstream agro-food commodity, midstream 
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manufacturing, and downstream transportation fuel. As shown in Figure 2, the industry diverts 
raw materials from food-feed agricultural chains to produce a product substituting and 
competing with the downstream petroleum value chain (indicated by the thinner shaded gray 
arrows). 
[Insert Figu e 2 here]
4. Methodology and data 
This is a case study on entrants in biofuel industry using multiple sets of data. The primary data 
is based on semi-structured interviews with producers and expert interviews conducted from 
2009 to 2012. The key ethanol producers interviewed include large firms e.g. Abengoa, BP, 
Petro China, and COFCO China, and smaller firms, e.g. Thai Oil, Saigon Petro, Zhongke 
Tianyuan New Energy (Guangzhou China), Bronzeoak (UK and the Philippines), Petro 
Vietnam (Petrosetco). We have also interviewed technology providers, e.g. Alfa-Laval, Bosch. 
The informants were senior leaders and managers including chairs, directors, and top managers 
of leading producers. The length of the interview varied from relatively short discussions to 
those lasting for about an hour. In addition, we interviewed other stakeholders, i.e. policy 
makers and researchers, employees of oil companies, representatives of trade associations, 
farmers and traders. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. Follow-up questions were 
done via email, Skype, and telephone. The main language was English with the exception of 
interviews in China, which were conducted in the Chinese language by one of the co-authors. 
Interview notes were taken in all instances; some interviewees objected to any audio recording. 
This textured data is used in thematic analysis to identify the R&Cs in accordance with the 
proposed taxonomical structure of pre-entry R&Cs (as in Figure 1) and the data is presented in 
greater detail in Table 2 and Table 3 in Section 5.
The secondary data (both quantitative and qualitative) also come from diverse sources, e.g. 
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industrial reports, company websites, and media coverage. The main data sources are the U.S. 
Renewable Fuels Association (RFA), the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) 
and industry reports (e.g. F.O. Licht). Given the global scope and fluidity of this sector, there 
are some inconsistencies in data. It is challenging, for example, to obtain accurate data for 
company production information for a new industry with many firms based in developing 
countries. Nevertheless, these uncertainties do not impede the main analysis and any other 
major discrepancies could be reconciled by triangulating using diverse sources as suggested by 
Huberman and Miles (1994).
4.1 Identification and Ranking of Global Ethanol Manufacturers
We identified and ranked the top-thirty ethanol manufacturers (see Appendix A) based on a 
review of production levels and installed capacity of the top manufacturers in major producing 
regions and estimating their market share up to the end of 2012. This is because at this point 
the rapid growth of the 2000s was beginning to slow and the industry had reached a more mature 
phase where the turmoil in the ranking of most of the leading manufacturers had begun to settle.  
We acknowledge that this approach inevitably produces a selection bias towards more 
successful firms. Nonetheless, the specifics of firm shakeouts and survival evolution are not the 
aim of our study. We seek to understand how successful large firms evolve after entering the 
biofuel sector, with a focus on entrants and vertical movement. In order to do so, we also track 
the historical evolution to examine when a firm first enters a specific stage of the new value 
chain. We did not take into account the role of many small/start-up firms - particularly those 
involved in the development of advanced biofuels. Despite they might have significant 
influence on the industrial structure in the future, they have a limited influence over the period 
of this study. 
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4.2 Classification of entrants and their pre-entry resources and capacities
Based on Appendix A, a classification was carried out with respect to the firms' pre-entry 
industry and the key R&Cs they brought to the new industry. The pre-entry backgrounds of the 
manufacturers were very diverse and could be classified into two main categories i.e. de alio 
and de novo. De alio entrants were those entrants with prior involvement in at least some stages 
of the biofuel v lue chain. They could be further divided in accordance with the form of prior 
involvement at the stages of what would become the new biofuels supply chain, as research has 
indicated systematic differences in performance of entrants with different backgrounds (Helfat 
and Leiberman, 2002). Based on our sample of the largest manufacturers, de alio entrants not 
only came from agricultural and fossil fuel sectors but also were technology and engineering 
firms. We therefore proposed four groups of entrants in accordance with their historical core 
business as shown in Table 1: (i) technology, (ii) farming & food processing, (iii) agro-food 
commodity trading, and (iv) oil & gas1. 
[Insert Table 1 here]
We define de novo entrants without differentiating between start-ups and entrepreneurial spin-
offs, which are, by definition, lacking in some of the R&Cs owned by the diversified de alio 
entrants (Chen et al., 2012). We acknowledge that entrepreneurial spin-offs, where the founder 
has prior experience in a related industry or has been employed by an incumbent, could possess 
certain relevant R&Cs (Shepherd and de Tienne, 2004; Roberts et al., 2011). Despite the 
1 We do not categorize entrants based on their very first business activity but rather on their core business before 
entry into biofuel manufacturing. There are, of course, some difficulties in categorizing some firms. For 
example, POET, which began with a farming industry background prior to 1986, moved into developing 
technology for its ethanol facility. Gradually, the firm grew substantially as a provider of technology and plant 
building services during the 1990s (POET, 2013), which we use as its core business prior to its major entry into 
biofuel manufacturing.
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possible contribution of a founder's prior experience, there are three reasons for taking this 
approach to classification. First, we propose that a firm's combinative R&Cs (Kagut and 
Zander, 1992) is significantly more important than the R&Cs controlled by any individual, 
given the nature and the scale of operations in biofuel industry. While firms can transfer some 
combinative R&Cs to the new industry such as via sourcing and securing feedstock or access 
to marketing channels, this is not possible for an individual founder (Helfat and Campo-
Rembado, 2016). Second, the differences in individual-level R&Cs are less significant given 
the size of the firms in our sample, i.e., the thirty largest global manufacturers. Third, even 
though individual R&C could be useful, any new entrant could probably acquire those R&Cs 
without substantial difficulty, as discussed below.
The first group of de alio entrants is engineering and technology firms (Group 1). They were 
among the largest ethanol firms in terms of installed capacity during the study period (Table 
1). These firms began by providing services in the design and building of ethanol facilities. 
They entered the ethanol-manufacturing stage to capitalize on their technical knowhow in the 
operation and management of such facilities. They also have the capabilities to perform R&D 
on advanced biofuel technologies, potentially gaining key longer-term competitive advantages 
against other manufacturers primarily depend on ethanol production using traditional (first 
generation) biofuel technologies.
Group 2 is made up of firms that have been active in the agricultural and food sector, often for 
many decades. This is a prominent group with a large number of firms (Table 1), who were 
among the earliest entrants, and is the largest group in terms of production capacity. They are 
farmers, farm cooperatives (particularly in the U.S.), and agro-food and sweetener producers 
that enjoy a high level of security of feedstock supply due to their extensive pre-entry R&Cs in 
agriculture-related sectors. These R&Cs in feedstock production and sourcing were built up 
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over their long history of involvement in cultivation, management, trade and processing of the 
feedstock used in biofuel production. Their competitive advantage would be difficult to acquire. 
Other firms would require a long time to build up these R&Cs, particularly in a market where 
feedstock liquidity is low. For instance, there are more of these firms in countries (such as 
Brazil) where feedstock liquidity is low due to asset specificity, compared with countries with 
higher liquidity in the feedstock market (e.g. U.S.)2. Capitalizing on these R&Cs, many firms 
in Group 2 were able to successfully integrate downstream into ethanol manufacturing and 
expand their installed capacity substantially within a short period. 
Similarly, the agricultural commodity traders in Group 3 entered into the production stage by 
leveraging their pre-entry knowledge of feedstock supply and markets. These firms have a 
strong ability to couple their access to capital with a good understanding of global supply 
chains, trade and markets for feedstock and ethanol. These served as their key competitive 
advantages when they moved from providing services as traders into ethanol production.
Group 4 consists of firms active in the traditional petroleum value chain. Historically, they have 
been the downstream customers of ethanol manufacturers but some have decided to enter the 
upstream ethanol value chain directly. We have documented both vertically integrated oil 
companies and independent refiners investing heavily in ethanol-manufacturing assets. They 
brought along R&Cs that were nearly impossible for firms in any other groups to match, such 
as knowledge of blending and the use of additives in the final products, logistics and 
infrastructure, and distribution and retail networks.
Group 5 is made up of start-ups with generally little previous background in biofuel-related 
sectors. They usually entered the market to capitalize on favorable government policies towards 
2 The main feedstock for biofuel production in Brazil is sugarcane, which is costly to transport for a long distance 
and the quality deteriorates quickly over time. The U.S. biofuel feedback is mainly corn which is less bulky than 
sugarcane.
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ethanol manufacturing and its use as a transportation fuel. Some of these de novo firms 
expanded quickly, for example, Verasun rose to top the list of global manufacturers for a short 
time in 2008-9. In general, though, the leading manufacturers in Group 5 were typically smaller 
in size than firms in other groups (Appendix A). 
Despite thei  dynamism, these de novo firms are vulnerable to the lack of R&Cs in comparison 
with de alio firms found in the other groups. For instance, during the 2008 global financial 
crisis many Group 5 firms (including Verasun, Pacific Ethanol, Aventine Renewable Energy, 
Panda Ethanol and Renew Energy) faced liquidity problems. The U.S. oil companies from 
Group 4 acquired the majority of the assets of firms such as Verasun and Panda Ethanol after 
they filed for bankruptcy. Without significant upstream-related R&Cs, Verasun, the most high-
profile casualty, depended on hedging its feedstock supply, but this strategy turned out to be 
fatal when feedstock prices fell sharply at the onset of the crisis. Other casualties, such as Pacific 
Ethanol and Aventine, managed to re-emerge after restructuring. 
5. Taxonomy of pre-entry resources and capabilities
The importance of pre-entry R&Cs has also been demonstrated in a number of studies. For 
instance, Klepper and Simons (2000) argue that the pre-entry experience of a firm is valuable 
across many industries and will affect their performance and survival in a new industry. 
However, not all types of pre-entry R&Cs are of equal importance. Previous studies suggest 
that firms have 'leveragable' assets of dynamic competencies (Teece and Pisano, 1994) or a 
bundle of skills and technologies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) when entering a new industry. 
But the question remains as to which critical pre-entry capabilities of a firm affect performance 
and ultimate survival. Some entrant's R&Cs are crucial for survival, for example in the case of 
the biofuel sector, the capability to source feedstock, particularly at times of severe competition 
for feedstock and high price volatility, especially in a marketplace where relational factors are 
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important, i.e., where trust and relationships must be built over time (Vangen and Huxham, 
2003). Therefore, we suggest that core R&Cs should be further classified as critical and non-
critical in accordance with industry characteristics. 
Previou  studies, particularly those adopting a resource-based view, have classified the R&Cs 
of firms according to a number of hierarchies or taxonomies. For example, Barney (1991) 
categorizes R&C into three types, i.e. physical, human, or organizational. Helfat and Lieberman 
(2002) provide a wide range of taxonomies, e.g., type of market entry opportunities, entrant 
type, mode of entry, core versus complementary R&Cs, and specialized versus generalized 
R&Cs. These approaches have primarily adopted the perspective of the entrant without 
considering the bundle of R&Cs required to be competitive in the new industry. An agro-food 
commodity firm, for example, may enter the ethanol-manufacturing stage, bringing along a 
bundle of core and complementary R&Cs. Complementary R&Cs are typically common across 
many industries, such as finance, accounting, human resources, and administration (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002). Core R&Cs are those specific to the industrial operations such as 
technological knowhow. However, within the subset of common R&Cs, the core R&Cs may 
not all be of equal importance. Which R&Cs really matter to obtaining sustainable competitive 
advantage in the new industry? Other classification of R&Cs related to industry- and market-
determined factors is Strategic Industry Factors (SIF) suggested by Amit and Schoemaker 
(1993) on how best to secure organizational rents. These Strategic Industry Factors are context 
dependent, differing from industry to industry and may be transient or more persistent.
Any mismatch between the entrant's R&Cs and the R&Cs required in the new industry could 
compromise the competitiveness and survival of the entrant. Within every entrant's R&Cs, there 
is a subset that is applicable to the new industry or overlapping with the required R&Cs for the 
new industry. For instance, the agro-food commodity firm may have tacit knowledge of the 
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feedstock market required in the ethanol manufacturing. Identifying the intersection of the 
entrant's pre-entry R&Cs and the new industry's required R&Cs is an important task in the entry 
decision-making process. The entrant would be able to know their strengths and competitive 
advantages in the new industry. Moreover, the entrant could also identify the missing core 
R&Cs required in the new industry and make decisions on how best to develop or acquire them.
We thereby propose to extend Helfat and Lieberman's (2002) taxonomy of R&C, by focusing 
on 'critical' R&Cs, which would satisfy the requirements laid out in the SIF framework. It is 
thereby important for a manager to fully evaluate their SIF prior to entry. Using ethanol 
manufacturing as an example, Table 2 illustrates a set of taxonomies of core versus 
complementary R&Cs based on interviews conducted with industrial experts and stakeholders. 
Further, critical R&Cs are those that are central to the competitiveness of the business and could 
be derived from the market- and industry-determined SIF.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In the case that the entrant does not own all the necessary critical R&Cs to match the SIF, it 
should logically seek to develop or acquire them and answer several key questions before 
proceeding. Can these missing critical R&Cs be easily developed within an acceptable 
timeframe before the entrant's competitiveness is compromised? Alternatively, if these missing 
critical R&Cs are tradable, can they be acquired and absorbed within the organization in 
sufficient time post-entry? To reflect these challenges, we propose a further classification based 
on 'ease of acquisition'.
Table 3 summarizes the pre-entry R&Cs of the five groups of entrants within the ethanol 
industry found in Table 1. For example, for Group 1 a requisite pre-entry capability in ethanol 
distillery process and operations is having a set of core R&Cs useful in ensuring efficient 
operations. However, ensuring normal operations of the ethanol distillery is not considered a 
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critical core R&C since it is commonly available, is rather mature and standardized and could 
be easily acquired. 
By contrast, the pre-entry R&Cs for Group 2 and Group 3 in the feedstock market are critical 
core R&Cs since they match with the required SIF and are especially important in an illiquid 
market. The ability to manage farmers and suppliers of feedstock is important to the success of 
any manufacturer, as feedstock costs can account for 60% or more of total manufacturer costs 
(Sanchez and Cardona, 2008). In addition, access to feedstock is especially critical during 
periods of tight supply. This capability is particularly difficult to acquire in a relational 
feedstock market.
[Insert Table 3 here]
6. Integration to seek out resources and capabilities
By tracing the evolution of the bio-ethanol sector over two decades, we observe a phenomenon 
of bi-directional vertical integration, where firms predominantly operating in downstream 
stages have integrated upstream and vice versa, as shown in Table 4. We find forward 
integration of larger firms in Group 1 (Engineering), Group 2 (agro-food cultivators and 
processors) and Group 3 (agro-food commodity traders) when they entered into the stage of 
manufacturing utilizing their pre-entry R&Cs as shown in Table 1. The strategic R&C available 
to the firms could be utilized to gain long-term competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984). For 
example, firms in Group 1 and Group 2 capitalized on their technological knowhow or 
knowledge of the feedstock supply, to develop a new line of businesses in an expanding ethanol 
market. 
 [Insert Table 4 here]
Moreover, several firms integrated further downstream into marketing, blending, distribution 
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and retailing in order to secure markets for their products. Table 4 shows the progression of 
firms integrating downstream, particularly since 2005. In most countries, traditional petroleum 
firms dominate these downstream stages of the value chain. Although growing, ethanol volume 
remains relatively small compared to gasoline in the overall blending volume. As there is excess 
petroleum refining capacity in some parts of the world, refiners can be reluctant to pursue 
ethanol blending and often seek to erect barriers to government aspirations to mandate any 
blending. The organizational inertia of incumbents is well known in many other industries 
(Agarwal and Moeen, 2016), In order to reach retail markets, ethanol manufacturers must often 
be proactive and integrate into downstream stages, especially into higher blend markets (i.e., 
where higher percentages of ethanol are used in the gasoline blend) that might provide one 
solution to a more passive position towards marketing their products. 
Another striking example is Cosan in Brazil, which has become the most vertically integrated 
ethanol firm in the world, occupying all stages along the sugarcane-based ethanol value chain 
after its acquisition of ExxonMobil's downstream operation in Brazil in 2008 (Table 4). 
Further, Raizen, formed by Cosan and Shell, has owned the fuel distribution and retail stages 
of both Cosan and Shell in Brazil since 2010. Cosan and Raizen hope for a more sustainable 
growth path than Verasun, which carried out the most spectacular downstream integration from 
2003 to 2006. Before filing for bankruptcy, Verasun had become the largest ethanol 
manufacturer in the world, with eleven operational plants and six new plants under construction 
or under development. It blended and marketed its own brand of E85 ethanol to 150 retailing 
stations across 15 U.S. states. Other examples of such vertical integration includes GPRE 
acquiring Blendstar in 2008 to move into downstream blending and distribution markets, and 
Pacific Ethanol creating a marketing arm - Kinergy Fuel Marketing. 
Table 4 and the discussion above offer some clear examples of forward integration of ethanol 
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manufacturers. A number of de novo firms and upstream de alio firms have integrated further 
downstream to production stages such as marketing, blending, distribution and retail. Ethanol 
manufacturers appreciate that they should not depend on incumbent oil companies to market a 
substitute for their own product and will need to break through the monopolization of oil 
companies at downstream stages of the value chain. 
As Perry (1988: 206) has suggested, one of the motivations for firms to employ vertical 
integration strategies is not only to secure the market for its product(s), but also to gain the 
ability to sell the quantity of output the firm wishes. This motivation to access the retail market 
appears to be critical in a market where incumbents control the marketing channels of the 
substitutes. 
Three types of backward integration have also been observed in the ethanol sector over the 
period studied. First, firms in the downstream value chain – transportation fuel refining, 
distribution and retailing, have integrated upwards to include the ethanol-manufacturing 
segment. These firms are required to fulfill their regulatory obligations in selling ethanol in 
various jurisdictions and therefore move upstream to enhance the security of their ethanol 
supply. Securing ethanol supply is unlikely to be the sole motivation in markets where liquidity 
in ethanol trading is high. Other motivations for oil companies to move into ethanol 
manufacturing include improving brand identity, building a more environmental-friendlier 
image or seeking additional rents. It is notable though that no international oil company apart 
from Shell has made it to the top thirty in ethanol manufacturing despite their unmatchable 
financial capability. Nonetheless, some petroleum refiners, especially those without an 
upstream oil exploration business such as Valero and Flint Hills Resources, have diverted away 
from the increasingly low-margin refining segment and into ethanol manufacturing. 
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The backward integration of oil firms into ethanol manufacturing and production of feedstock 
increased but only slowly over the period of study. This sluggishness was possibly due to inertia 
or a mismatch between the set of organizational skills required (Teece et al., 1997) for their 
conventional operations (in oil, especially upstream activities) and those needed for the new 
venture (in agro-business). Key differences include scale of investment, expectation of returns, 
lack of experience in agricultural commodity markets, agricultural management and social and 
political aspects of agricultural activities. Therefore, pre-entry R&C could also constrain a 
firm's decision to engage in vertical integration as proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982) and 
Jacobides et al. (2009).
Second, some ethanol manufacturers have integrated downstream into feedstock trading, and 
further into feedstock cultivation as well as land ownership. Manufacturers without any pre-
entry R&C in feedstock supply have been inclined to integrate upstream to mitigate the risks of 
uncertainty in feedstock supply and price volatility. In the U.S., those manufacturers operating 
without a degree of upstream integration, e.g., de novo entrants, have been susceptible to high 
feedstock supply risks. In response, firms most exposed to such risks, such as Verasun, have 
sought to mitigate them. By contrast, the two leading U.S. ethanol manufacturers – ADM and 
POET – escaped a similar fate because they had a stronger degree of integration upstream in 
both trading and cultivation of maize. Firms, such as those in Group 2 and 3, with pre-entry 
experience in similar industries or supply chains, have demonstrated that they are more resilient, 
in agreement with the findings of Klepper and Simons (2000).
There is a tendency towards backward integration from manufacturing to farming/commodity 
trading, although this is less prevalent in certain regions, notably the U.S. The high liquidity in 
the U.S. feedstock market provides less incentive for integration. In addition, barriers to entry, 
including capital requirements, skills, and land acquisitions, can also be high since farm size is 
Page 51 of 64 Industrial Management & Data Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Industrial M
anagem
ent & Data System
s
20
generally large. By contrast, a large number of Brazilian manufacturers own and lease land for 
cane cultivation due to favorable social-political and historical factors. There is also less 
backward integration of manufacturers in countries such as China, Thailand, Vietnam and the 
Philippines because of unfavorable macro-institutional factors.
We conclude with three observations about backward integration. First, firms without pre-entry 
R&Cs would likely integrate downstream to ensure high security of feedstock supply, which is 
in line with resolving uncertainty and thereby reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1996).  
Security of supply includes the ability to obtain the quantity of feedstock required at a stable 
and desirable price, since ethanol manufacturers are mostly price takers in the feedstock market. 
A similar phenomenon can be found in the oil industry's move upstream to secure oil reserves 
(Buzzell, 1983). 
Second, there are notable exceptions in downstream integration, particularly in certain markets, 
where institutional forces might undermine attempts to integrate further upstream (such as into 
cultivation stages). For example, in the case where there are a large number of small family 
farms at the cultivation stage, and there is political sensitivity and even legal prohibitions on 
land ownership by large corporations and foreigners, such as in China, Thailand and Vietnam.  
The third type of backward integration is the integration of ethanol manufacturers into the 
engineering and technology stage based on a motivation to enhance economies of scope. In the 
U.S. for instance, both POET and ADM have the capability to design and build distilleries. A 
newcomer at this stage is Shree Renuka of India - a sugar-ethanol company with operating units 
in India and Brazil. In 2007, it acquired KBK, an engineering and construction company based 
in India, which builds distilleries throughout Asia. 
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7. Theoretical and practical implications
This study attempts to understand industrial life cycles at their early stages. By mapping out the 
development of the bio-ethanol sector, we conclude that new entrants need to understand their 
pre-entry R&Cs and how those match with the critical R&Cs required to survive in their new 
industry. First, we propose that the R&Cs of new entrants should be classified as either critical 
or non-critical. Many very successful biofuel firms belong to the de alio group. A de novo firm's 
survival rate is expected to be lower than that of a de alio firm as suggested by other studies 
such as Geroski (1995) and Helfat and Lieberman (2002), which has led to the 'dominance by 
birthright' theory propounded by Klepper and Simons (2000). Successful de alio firms have 
been shown to leverage their critical pre-entry R&Cs when entering into the biofuel market. 
Experience increases the value of entry and encourages entry into new markets, as found in 
King and Tucci (2002). However, not all pre-entry R&Cs are equally important. Therefore, we 
need to classify them in terms of their criticality to the performance and survival of the entrant, 
which are context specific to an industry or market. 
A further classification of entrant's R&Cs in terms of 'ease of acquisition' is also proposed – if 
any R&Cs could be easily acquired within a short period of time, the competitive advantage of 
de alio firms would diminish rapidly. Similarly, entrants, even those that have grown into 
sizable firms, may fail because of their inability to build the critical R&Cs in time. Thus, a key 
post-entry strategy is to identify and acquire critical R&Cs, which an entrant has yet to control. 
Therefore, we observe that biofuel firms integrate further up or down along the value chain in 
order to acquire new R&Cs, since they will be critical for their survival and growth in the new 
industry. We propose that de novo entrepreneurial firms in a rapidly evolving green sector need 
to quickly identify critical R&Cs in their industry and strategize to acquire and control them in 
order to survive and growth. Through waves of acquisition and shifting control over critical 
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R&Cs, the evolution of the biofuel industry demonstrates a consistent phenomenon of bi-
directional vertical integration. 
The motivations for vertical integration could be explained by resources-driven integration 
(Eschen and Bresser, 2005) with the intention of avoiding uncertainty as proposed in 
Transaction Cost Theory (Williamson, 1975). It is also consistent with the findings of a recent 
study of the U.S. brewing industry (Walter et al., 2016) where firms actively deployed strategic 
choice (Short and Payne, 2008) to develop the necessary capabilities to avoid being shaken out. 
Kapoor (2018) has also demonstrated the persistence of semiconductor industry to integrate 
vertically despite the waves of specialization. In conclusions, similar to Helfat (2015), we find 
that the evolution towards greater vertical integration depends on the needs to control critical 
R&Cs, which are context specific.    
In addition, our study also suggests that a firm's prior experience could impose constraints on 
post-entry strategic choice of vertical structure, building on studies such as Nelson and Winter 
(1982) and Jacobides et al. (2009). For example, we can see the reluctance of incumbent firms 
(i.e. oil companies) to invest in biofuel manufacturing, which included an unfamiliar upstream 
sector (agriculture) with low returns (at least compared to traditional petroleum).
Limitations and future work
Finally, there are two aspects that we do not consider here and would therefore recommend for 
future study. We do not assess the interaction between institutional factors and a firm's 
stakeholders in influencing or facilitating strategic movements along the value chain. We also 
do not take into consideration the implications of advanced technological development in the 
biofuels sector, which although negligible over the period of our study, could be revolutionary 
in changing the configuration and governance of the value chain in the future. For instance, 
three commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol facilities with a combined capacity of 284 million 
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liters have begun production in the U.S. in 2015 (RFA, 2016). 
There are a number of other nascent 'green' industries, which would benefit from a similar 
treatment.  Offshore wind and solar photovoltaic panels (which has similar characteristics of a 
commoditized technology with firms entering from adjacent sectors) or bio-plastics derived 
from agricultural materials are obvious parallels. Still other even newer industries, such as those 
involving the Internet of Things, are probably at too early a stage to provide sufficient evidence, 
but they may be fruitful areas to explore within a few years. Evidence from other sectors could 
reinforce or expand our understanding of firm survival.
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Table 1: Industry of origin - Global top-thirty ethanol manufacturers as of end of 2012
Group Type of entrant - 
industry of 
origin
Description Manufacturers Global 
rank
POET 2
Abengoa Bioenergy 4
1 De alio - 
Engineering
Technical & 
engineering industry 
background ETH Bioenergia 5
Cosan – Raizen* 7
Guardian Energy 10
Tereos - Guarani 13
Shree Renuka 15
Big River Resources 16
Jilin Alcohol 18
TianGuan 26
Sao Martinho - Nova Fontiera 20
2 De alio - Farming Farmer and farmer 
cooperatives and agro-
food and sweetener 
manufacturers. These 
firms have a long 
history in food/ 
sweetener, and some in 
alcohol production too
Greenfield Ethanol 29
ADM 1
Louis Dreyfus 8
Cargill 11
Bunge 14
COFCO 17
The Andersons Group 19
Noble Group 22
3 De alio - Agro-
food commodity 
trading
Main activities are 
sourcing or marketing 
agricultural 
commodities. Some 
have diversified and 
also involved in food 
processing industry
Marquis Energy 27
Valero RF. 3
Shell - Raizen* 7
Flint Hills Resources 9
Murphy Oil 25
CNPC 30
4 De alio  - Oil and 
gas
Oil and gas firms and 
downstream marketers 
of motor gasoline
Petrobras-Guarani, N Frontiera ** 13; 20
Green Plains Renewable Energy 6
Aventine Renewable Energy*** 12
White Energy 21
BioFuel Energy 23
Pacific Ethanol 24
5 De novo Entrepreneurial spin-
offs and start-ups with 
little or no background 
in the biofuel supply 
chain
Glacial Lakes Energy 28
Sources: Company websites 
Note: *For Raizen, its parent companies, Cosan and Shell, were considered separately (Raizen, 2013). 
**Petrobras holds a substantial stake in both Guarani and Nova Frontiera Bioenergy, but does not have a 
controlling interest.
***Aventine Renewable Energy was merged with Pacific Ethanol in July 2015 demonstrating the 
continuing evolution of the industry in both expanding scope and scale. 
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Table 2: Taxonomy of resources and capabilities: Critical R&C of ethanol manufacturers
Core versus complementary resources and capabilities (R&C)
Core
Critical Non-critical
Complementary
Specialised R&C core to 
operations that match the 
requirements of SIF, e.g.:
Specialised R&C core to 
operations, e.g.:
Supporting general R&C needed 
to ensure smooth operation in the 
new industry, e.g.:
 Feedstock markets and pricing 
knowledge
 Relationships with feedstock 
suppliers
 Fuel markets and pricing 
knowledge
 Plant operations 
 Logistics and distribution
 Local and country-level 
knowledge/policy
 Co-products markets and 
pricing knowledge
 Finance and accounting 
 Administration and HR
 Engineering
 R&D (short to medium term)
Sources: Authors, based on interviews and analysis of expert opinions. 
Table 3: Taxonomy of resources and capabilities: Ease of acquisition of critical R&C
Type of entrant Core pre-entry R&C Critical R&C Ease of acquisition 
Group 1: Technology, 
engineering and 
construction firms
Process and operations 
knowledge
Not critical, but it could 
be significant if advanced 
technology is developed
Easy to acquire to a 
satisfactory degree
Group 2: Farmer/farm 
cooperatives and agro-food 
manufacturers
Familiarity with feedstock 
market and control of 
supply, insurance and risk 
management
Highly critical at times of 
scarcity and high volatility
Takes a long time to 
acquire
Group 3: Agricultural 
commodities traders
Familiarity with feedstock 
market, access to credit, 
insurance, and risk 
management
Highly critical at times of 
scarcity and high volatility
Takes a long time to 
acquire
Group 4: Traditional 
petroleum firms and 
downstream marketers
Knowhow in blendstock 
and additives, control 
downstream supply chain
Critical in controlling 
downstream market 
access 
Could be acquired but 
need capital to build 
infrastructure
Group 5: De novo 
entrepreneurial start-ups
Dynamic and 
entrepreneurial
Not critical but important 
for long-term growth
Could be acquired or 
developed but not a 
critical R&C 
Sources: Authors, based on interviews and analysis of expert's opinions. 
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Table 4: Examples of bi-directional vertical integration in bioethanol sector 
Upstream Midstream Downstream
2013
Global 
Rank Firm (Country)
Plant-
ation
Agro-
food / 
service
Ethanol 
Manu-
facture
Market-
ing
Refine/
Blend Wholesale Retail
4 Abengoa (Spain) * * 2000 2003 2007 2007
7 Cosan (Brazil) ~1986 ~1936 ~1970 * 2008 2008 2008
6 GPRE (US) 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008
22
Noble (Hong 
Kong) 2007 1994 2007 2007
7
Shell 
(Netherlands) 2010 2010 *
13/20 Petrobras (Brazil) 2010 2010 2010 *
N/A Verasun, US 2003 2005 2005 2006
Source: Data from manufacturers' websites, industry reports and market news reports.
Notes: 
i) Shaded cell(s) indicate the firm's industry(ies) of origin. 
ii) 'Year' or '*' denotes a new position (stage) occupied by the firm and the corresponding year of 
integration into that specific stage of production along the value chain. 
iii) * - Data not available.
Figure 1: Proposed taxonomic structure for pre-entry resources and capabilities.
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Figure 2: Fuel-ethanol value chain: a crossover of agro-food commodity to energy
Note: Shaded stages represent fuel-ethanol value chain. Produced by the authors.
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Appendix A: Top-thirty global manufacturers and market shares, as of end of 2012
Global 
Rank
Company Main operating 
country
(HQ)
Global 
share %
Country 
share 
(U.S.) %
Country 
share 
(Brazil) %
1 Archer Daniels Midland U.S., Brazil (U.S.) 5.7 12.6 -
2 POET U.S. 4.7 10.6 -
3 Valero Renewable Fuels U.S. 3.2 7.3 -
4 Abengoa Bioenergy Corp Europe, U.S., 
Brazil (Spain)
3.2 2.6 0.6
5 ETH Bioenergia Brazil 2.3 - 7.0
6 Green Plains Renewable 
Energy (GPRE)
U.S. 2.1 4.7 -
7 Raizen (Cosan & Shell) Brazil 1.9 - 5.8
8 Louis Dreyfus/Santelisa Vale Brazil, U.S.
(Netherlands)
1.8 - 4.2
9 Flint Hills Resources U.S. 1.6 3.6 -
10 Guardian Energy (& alliances) U.S. 1.6 3.6 -
11 Cargill Inc U.S., Brazil, 
Europe (U.S.)
1.4 2.2 -
12 Aventine Renewable Energy U.S. 1.3 3.1 -
13 Guarani (Tereos & Petrobras) Europe, Brazil
(France)
1.3 - 2.0
14 Bunge/Moema Brazil, U.S.
(U.S.)
1.3 1.1 2.6
15 Shree Renuka/Equipav Brazil, India
(India)
1.3 - 3.4
16 Big River Resources LLC U.S. 1.0 2.3 -
17 COFCO China 1.0 - -
18 Jilin Province Alcohol Ind. China 0.9 - -
19 The Andersons Ethanol LLC U.S. 0.9 2.1 -
20 Nova Frontiera Bioenergy 
(Sao Martinho & Petrobras)
Brazil 0.8
21 White Energy U.S. 0.7 1.7 -
22 Noble Group Brazil, U.S. 
(Hong Kong)
0.7 - 1.9
23 BioFuel Energy LLC U.S. 0.7 1.5 -
24 Pacific Ethanol U.S. 0.7 1.5 -
25 Murphy Oil U.S. 0.6 1.5 -
26 TianGuan China 0.6 - -
27 Marquis Energy LLC U.S. 0.6 1.4 -
28 Glacial Lakes Energy LLC U.S. 0.6 1.3 -
29 Greenfield Ethanol Canada 0.5 - -
30 CNPC (Jilin Fuel Ethanol) China 0.5 - -
Note: (1) Includes plant capacity under construction and plants with significant minority stake. Total world 
capacity is estimated at 132 billion litres (U.S.=58B; Brazil=43B; rest of world =31B)
(2) '-' = not calculated as not part of top twenty manufacturers in respective country.
Sources: Estimation based on data from EIA (2013); GAIN (2012); RFA (2013); UNICA (2010), firm 
websites and annual reports.
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